C0037 cli-secret-flags¶
Rule: No option takes a secret as its value.
| Code | C0037 (stable, never reused) |
| Id | cli-secret-flags |
| Category | cli |
| Source | spirit_level |
| Fix | by hand |
| Needs | cargo installed |
Level per tier¶
| Tier | Level | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| small | warn |
a candidate: a flag's name is a guess at its purpose, so a human reads each hit; the shell history and the process list both see a value passed on the command line |
| small-workspace | warn |
a candidate: a flag's name is a guess at its purpose, so a human reads each hit; the shell history and the process list both see a value passed on the command line |
| medium | warn |
a candidate: a flag's name is a guess at its purpose, so a human reads each hit; the shell history and the process list both see a value passed on the command line |
| big | warn |
a candidate: a flag's name is a guess at its purpose, so a human reads each hit; the shell history and the process list both see a value passed on the command line |
| ai | off | |
| embedded | off | |
| ui | off | |
| egui | off | |
| units-strict | off | |
| units-paranoid | off |
Parameters¶
| Name | Type | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
words |
list of strings | ["token", "password", "secret", "api-key"] |
words that mark a flag's long name as holding a secret |
safe-suffixes |
list of strings | ["file", "path", "env", "stdin"] |
a word right after a match that means the flag points at the secret, not holds it |
Why¶
A value passed on the command line sits in the shell history and in ps output for every user on the box. A secret taken that way (--token abc123, --password hunter2) leaks twice over. The right shape reads it from a file, stdin or an environment variable instead.
An option whose long name matches a word in words (token, password, secret, api-key) and takes a value is flagged, unless the next word in its name is in safe-suffixes (file, path, env, stdin): --token-file <PATH> points at where the secret lives, not at the secret itself, and passes.
--token <TOKEN> <- reported: the token itself as the value
--db-password <PASS> <- reported
--token-file <PATH> <- passes: the flag's value is a path
The lint is a candidate: a flag's long name is a guess at what it holds, so it never fails a run at any level and a person reads each hit.
How to fix¶
Take the secret from --token-file <PATH> (read the file) or from stdin, or read it straight from an environment variable, and drop the flag that takes the secret as a value. List a flag in safe-suffixes when its project uses another indirection word for the same pattern.
Configure¶
[lints.cli-secret-flags]
level = "deny"
words = ["token", "password", "secret", "api-key"]
safe-suffixes = ["file", "path", "env", "stdin"]
reason = "why this project wants it at this level"
Allow one finding in the code with // spirit-level: allow(cli-secret-flags) <reason> (waivers); the code works there too, as in [lints.C0037].